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Abstract
RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) is a widely used access control model, which reduces the maintenance cost of classical
identity-based access control. However, despite the benefits of RBAC, there are environments in which RBAC can hardly be ap-
plied. We present FRBAC (Fuzzy Role-Based Access Control), a generalization of RBAC through fuzzy relations that extends the
applicability of RBAC to environments where authorization-related information is vague. Moreover, FRBAC deals with environ-
ments where the actions that can be executed over the resources have a fractional meaning, as data lying in databases and risk-based
access control.
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1. Introduction
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [14, 4, 3] is widely
used in corporate environments with many advantages, but it
presents some problems and imposes some constraints in envi-
ronments where the authorization-related information is impre-
cise. One example is the Aware Home project [2] where the
level of accuracy of authenticating sensors is not perfect and
thus this imprecision must be taken into account in the access
decision.
Moreover, RBAC and in general traditional access control
models, do no fit well in scenarios where actions have a frac-
tional meaning and it makes no sense to permit or not their ex-
ecution but to permit the execution of actions to a given degree.
Data lying in databases is an example, where the responses to
queries are modified in order to add a certain percentage of
noise [19]. Another example is risk-based access control [13]
where the system may allow the execution of an action with risk
mitigation measures.
The aim of this paper is to introduce Fuzzy Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (FRBAC) as a generalization of RBAC. It relies
on the fuzzy user-role and role-permission assignments. These
fuzzy assignments allow to deal in a natural way with impre-
cise information and propagate it through the user-permission
relation to the access decision. The access decision can be for-
mulated with a fractional meaning or it can be defuzzified in
order to deal with permissions that only have a binary sense.
Furthermore, the FRBAC model contemplates role hierarchies
and separation of duties.
Fuzzy relations, and fuzzy concepts in general, have been
used to extend current access control models [17, 9, 15]. Fo-
cusing on RBAC, some proposals [18, 7, 16] aim to ease the
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user-role assignment through the notion of user trustworthiness
and role required trustworthiness. A user is assigned to a role if
the user trustworthiness is equal or greater than the role required
trustworthiness. [9] makes an analogy between roles and trust
degrees, so permissions are assigned to trust degrees rather than
roles. The user trustworthiness determines the permissions that
the user can activate. [11] provides additional security checks
on top of RBAC when dealing with database security. The
model determines the user’s need to read and write records. A
fuzzy multi-objective decision making process is used to deter-
mine whether a query can be executed or not.
We provide a novel approach by considering the fuzziness of
the RBAC model itself rather than adding fuzzy concepts on top
of a traditional RBAC model contributing with a more clear and
generic definition. Our work builds on previous ideas which
aim to add flexibility to traditional access control models [6,
10, 1]. We are not aware of any proposal based on the ideas
of RBAC which provides such flexibility in the user-role, role-
permission assignment and the access decisions.
2. FRBAC
We introduce FRBAC departing from the RBAC definition
of the standard in [5], which evolved to [4]. The standard di-
vides the RBAC model into three parts: Core RBAC, which
includes the basic functionality; Hierarchical RBAC, extending
the Core with role hierarchies; and Constrained RBAC, incor-
porating separation of duties constraints. Analogously, we in-
troduce Core FRBAC, Hierarchical FRBAC, and Constrained
FRBAC.
We use the following notation and definitions (as described
in the RBAC definition from [4]).
• US ERS is a set of users.
• ROLES is a set of roles.
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• OBS is a set of resources (objects).
• OPS is a set of operations.
• PRMS =2(OBS ×OPS ) is a set of permissions.
• UA ⊆US ERS ×ROLES is a set of user-role assignments.
• PA ⊆PRMS ×ROLES is a set of role-permission assign-
ments.
Although we follow the notation and definitions of RBAC,
notice that we describe a di fferent formulation in order to ease
the understanding of the scheme. Regarding the use of sessions
and subjects (questioned by some authors [12]), we do not fol-
low the same notation and approach of the standard. Instead, we
use a simpler approach, which helps to make our model more
clear introducing a new relation (see Section 2.1) to determine
the active roles of a given user.
2.1. Core FRBAC
The foundations of FRBAC are the user-role and the role-
permission assignments defined through fuzzy relations of the
form:
• UA : US ERS ×ROLES → [0,1]
• PA : ROLES ×PRMS → [0,1]
That is, there is a mapping relating users with roles, and an-
other mapping relating roles with permissions. The user-role
mapping is a set of items of the form ((u ,r), µUA (u,r)) where
u ∈ US ERS , r ∈ ROLES , and µUA (u,r) is a function that
returns the user-role relation strength. The strength is valued
in the real unit interval [0,1]. The role-permission relation
has an analogous form: ((r, p), µPA(r, p)) where r ∈ROLES ,
p ∈PRMS , and µPA(r, p) → [0,1].
In FRBAC the notion of role activation has a di fferent ap-
proach than RBAC and it is defined through the active assign-
ments relation (AA) which is a subset of the user-role assign-
ments containing the active roles for the users. The active as-
signments relation supports the principle of least privilege in
that a user that is assigned to multiple roles may activate any
subset of these roles to suit his or her tasks:
• AA ⊆UA : US ERS ×ROLES → [0,1]
The user-permission relation (U P) is computed as the com-
position of the AA and PA relations and it is a collection
of items of the form ((u , p), µUP (u, p)) where u ∈ US ERS ,
p ∈PRMS , and µUP (u, p) is a function that returns the user-
role relation strength. The U P relation is defined as:
• UP =AA ◦ PA : US ERS ×PRMS → [0,1]
Where the composing operand◦ stands for the standard max-
min composition of two fuzzy relations. Let R1 : X ×Y → [0,1]
and R2 : Y ×Z → [0,1] be two fuzzy relations, the max-min
composition R1 ◦R2 : X ×Z → [0,1] is defined as follows:
R1 ◦R2 = {((x,z),max
y
(min(µR1 (x,y), µR2 (y,z))))|
x ∈X,y ∈Y,z ∈Z}
Although we use the maximum operand as the union and the
minimum as the intersection of fuzzy sets, note that other t-
conorm and t-norm operands could be used respectively, giving
up also to another relation composition operand [8].
Given the U P relation, we define the following function in
order to compute the user-permission relation for a given user:
• user permissions(u : US ERS ) → {(p, µUP (u, p))}, where
p ∈PRMS and µUP (u, p)) → [0,1]. That is, given a user
u, the function user permissions(u) returns a fuzzy set
containing the permissions assigned to the user as well as
the strength of the assignment. The function is described
as follows:
user permissions(u) = {(p, µUP (u, p))|
((u, p), µUP (u, p)) ∈UP}
At access decision time, the response is subjected to find a
privilege related to the user which allows the execution of the
given action over the given resource. For those scenarios where
the access has a fractional meaning, we define the following
function:
• access : US ERS ×OPS ×OBS → [0,1]. That is, given
a user u, an operation op and an object o, the access func-
tion returns the access degree that the user u has over the
resource o through the operation op. The function is de-
scribed as follows:
access(u ,op,o) = {µUP (u, p)|
(p, µUP (u, p)) ∈user permissions(u) ∧ (op,o) ∈p}
The enforcement point must guarantee that the requested ac-
tion is executed (if permitted) under the execution parameters
represented by the access decision strength.
Of course, there are scenarios where the applicability of the
operations over resources is binary: the action is entirely exe-
cuted or it is not executed at all. We define a security threshold
δ in order to defuzzificate the access decisions, so a permission
is applicable only if the decision strength is equal or greater
than δ. This threshold states the maximum imprecision level
that the system is willing to tolerate. The given semantics of
the security threshold are imposed by the application itself and
the meaning of the UA and PA relations (see Section 3). The
access function is then redefined as:
• accessδ : US ERS ×OPS ×OBS → BOOLEAN. That is,
given a user u, an operation op and an object o, the access
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function returns a boolean value which dictates whether
the user u is allowed to execute the action op over the re-
source o. The function is described as follows:
accessδ(u,op,o) =access(u,op,o) ≥ δ
2.2. Hierarchical FRBAC
The RBAC standard defines a hierarchical relation between
roles. Given a role r, the set of users belonging to the role (Ur)
and the set of permissions assigned to the role (P r), a role r0 is
a junior role of r if U r ⊆ Ur0 and P r0 ⊆ Pr. That is, the per-
missions of the senior role are inherited from the permissions
of the junior role, and the users of the senior roles also belong
to the users of the junior roles.
Inheritance is described in the RBAC standard as a partial
order (reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive) RH on ROLES:
• RH ⊆ROLES ×ROLES
In FRBAC, the inheritance relation RH is described as a re-
flexive, antisymmetric and transitive fuzzy order relation:
• RH : ROLES ×ROLES → [0,1]
The fuzzy inheritance mapping is a set of items of the form
((r,r0), µRH (r,r0)) where r and r 0 ∈ROLES , and µRH (r,r0) is a
function that returns the inheritance strength. The strength is
valued in the real unit interval [0 ,1]. The senior role is repre-
sented by r, and r 0 represents the junior one. Note that the re-
flexive property guarantees that∀r ∈ROLES ⇒ µRH (r,r) =1.
It is noteworthy to mention that a crisp inheritance model,
where the inheritance relation is binary, can be easily accom-
modated in FRBAC settingµRH (r,r0) as 1 if r is a senior role of
r0and 0 otherwise.
The user-role assignment, the active assignments and user-
permission assignment under the presence of role hierarchies is
determined by the following relations:
• UA↓=UA ◦RH : US ERS ×ROLES → [0,1]
• AA↓⊆UA↓ : US ERS ×ROLES → [0,1]
• UP↓=AA↓◦ PA : US ERS ×PRMS → [0,1]
The UP ↓ relation replaces the U P relation described in the
Core FRBAC model when computing the user-permission as-
signment (user permissions(u)) in order to make the access de-
cision (access(u,op,o) and accessδ(u,op,o)).
2.3. Constrained FRBAC
The RBAC standard defines two types of separation of duties:
Static Separation of Duties (SSD) and Dynamic Separation of
Duties (DSD). SSD apply in RBAC in order to prevent users
to be assigned to a role set which allows by itself to misuse the
system. DSD restricts the roles that a user activates in a session.
The RBAC standard defines both the collection SSD and
DSD as:
• S S D⊆(2ROLES × N+)
• DS D ⊆(2ROLES × N+)
SSD is a collection of pairs (rs ,n), where each rs is a role
set and n is a natural number greater or equal than 2, with the
property that no user is assigned to n or more roles from the set
r s. DSD has a similar form with the property that no user is
active in n or more roles of the set rs.
In order to deal with separation of duties restrictions in FR-
BAC, we define the following functions:
• role users(r : ROLES ) → 2US ERS . Given a role r, the
role users(r) function returns the set of users assigned to
the role. The function is described as follows:
role users(r) = {u|
((u,r), µUA (u,r)) ∈UA ∧ µUA (u,r) >0}
• active role users(r : ROLES ) → 2US ERS . Given a role r,
the active role users(r) function returns the set of active
users of the role. The function is described as follows:
active role users(r) = {u|
((u,r), µAA(u,r)) ∈AA ∧ µAA(u,r) >0}
SSD restrictions are fulfilled if, for all (rs,n) ∈S S D, no user
is assigned to n or more mutually exclusive roles from the set
rs. That is:
∀(rs,n) ∈S S D, ∀s ⊆ r s : |s| ≥ n ⇒ ∩
r∈s
role users(r) = ∅
DSD restrictions are fulfilled if, for all (rs,n) ∈DS D, no user
has active n or more mutually exclusive roles from the set rs.
The function active role users(r) and the relation DS D replace
the function role users(r) and the relation S S D in the above
sentence.
Under the presence of role hierarchies, separation of duties
restrictions must take into account implicit user-role assign-
ments by virtue of the role inheritance. The UA ↓ relation re-
places U A in the role users(r) function and the AA ↓ relation
replaces AA in the active role users(r) function.
3. Applicability of the approach
In this section we show some application scenarios and ex-
amples of FRBAC.
3.1. Data lying in databases
One example of fractional actions can be found in data lying
in databases [19]. Data lying is, in fact, an access control mech-
anism that allows to add a degree of uncertainty in the query
responses. A censor module is in charge to properly distort the
query responses in order to add noise. This adjustable degree of
uncertainty fits well with the notion of fractional actions since
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the more privileges the user has, the more truth she obtains in
the responses.
In terms of access control, the censor module can be seen
as the policy enforcement point of the application. That is, the
censor receives a query submitted by a user and obtains the sub-
mitter’s privileges. Taking into account the user’s privileges,
the censor module determines whether the user can execute the
action and, if permitted, in what degree.
FRBAC can easily accommodate an RBAC-based data ly-
ing scheme. The user-role relation strength can represent use-
ful authorization-related information such as user’s trustwor-
thiness, user’s seniority, user’s need-to-know, or any other
application-dependent information, which can be considered
useful at authorization time. The role-privilege relation strength
must be coherent with the user-role relation in order to allow
their composition. Finally, the user-privilege strength is used in
the censor module to enforce the execution of the query.
3.1.1. Example
Consider a database of a hospital which can be accessed by
an external party in order to carry out epidemical research. The
user-role assignment strength represents the user’s trustworthi-
ness. The role-privilege assignment is computed as the average
of user’s trustworthiness of all the members of the role. The
role-privileges and the active user-role assignments are shown
in Table 1.
Cardio. Radio.
user1 0.8 0
user2 0.9 0
user3 0 0.5
QueryDB
Cardio. 0.85
Radio. 0.5
Table 1: Active user-role and role-permission assignments.
Composing the relations, it can be derived that user 1 is as-
signed to the permission QueryDB through a magnitude of 0.8.
Thus, the user 1 is allowed to query the database and receive
answers with a certainty degree of 0.8 [19].
3.2. Uncertain user authentication
In some environments, the fact that a user is assigned to a
role is based on uncertain information. This phenomenon can
be observed in the Aware Home Project [2], where information
available from sensors in the home should be used to automat-
ically infer the user’s security-relevant attributes (e.g., identity,
role or location.). Many such sensors can establish the security-
relevant attributes of a subject with only a partial level of cer-
tainty, or confidence level.
The FRBAC model can naturally accommodate the accuracy
degree of a user belonging to a role through the user-role as-
signment strength. This imprecision degree can be propagated
through the user-permission relation to the access decision. The
access decision can be formulated in a fuzzy manner if the ac-
tion being requested has a fractional meaning. Otherwise, the
access decision can be defuzzified, setting δ as the maximum
imprecision degree that the system is willing to tolerate.
3.2.1. Example
Covington et al. [2] describe the following scenario: “[...]
consider an adult who wants to view the output of a video cam-
era in a childs bedroom, for the purpose of checking on the
child. The security policy may state that only the childs parents
or babysitter can view the video. Perhaps a strong identifica-
tion mechanism may provide enough authentication evidence to
allow the user to see a streaming video, while a weak identifi-
cation mechanism may provide only enough authentication ev-
idence to permit the user to view a recent still image of reduced
quality and definition. [...]”.
Imagine that the user Alice plays the role babysitter. Alice
has been identified through a voice recognition sensor which
provides 70% of accuracy. The system relates Alice with the
role babysitter through a magnitude of 0 .7. The users of the
role babysitter are allowed to view the output of the video cam-
era (that is a role-privilege strength of 1). Composing both,
the user-role and role privilege assignments leads the user-
permission strength of the relation Alice-AccessCam as 0.7. Fi-
nally, Alice will be allowed to view the output of the video cam-
era with a reduction of quality and definition according to the
magnitude of the privilege assignment.
3.3. Other applications
We briefly describe some more examples showing the appli-
cability of FRBAC.
3.3.1. Risk-based access control
Access control can be understood as a mechanisms used to
manage risk, i.e., to balance the information needs of the users
with the need of the organization to protect its sensitive infor-
mation [13]. FRBAC can be used as the basis of a risk-based
access control. The user-role relation strength can represent the
risk associated to the fact that a user belongs to a role. The
magnitude of strength is application-dependent and can be de-
rived from the user trustworthiness, for example. In the same
way, the role-permission relation strength can represent the risk
involving the assignment of a given permission to a role. The
user-privilege relation would reflect the risk involving the as-
signment of a given privilege to a given user. The enforcement
point of the application must evaluate the risk in order to deter-
mine possible risk mitigation measures conditioning the execu-
tion of the action, if permitted.
3.3.2. Exploration of role hierarchies
Inheritance relations can be found out comparing the user’s
membership and the permissions assigned between di fferent
roles. The RBAC standard defines an inheritance relation be-
tween two roles if all the members of the senior role are a sub-
set of the members of the junior one and all the privileges of
the junior role also belong to the privileges of the senior one.
However, there are roles that do not completely meet these con-
ditions but they do it in some extent. Analyzing the user’s mem-
bership and the role-permission assignment, the inheritance de-
gree of two roles can be computed determining how close are
the roles to meet the two inheritance conditions. It can be used
just with an analytic propose or to enable fuzzy inheritance.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper we have described FRBAC, a generalization of
RBAC built on fuzzy sets. FRBAC defines the user-role, role-
permission and thus the user-permission assignments as fuzzy
relations. It allows to deal with imprecise authorization-related
information and propagate it to the access decision. FRBAC
allows to formulate fractional access decisions in order to deal
with scenarios where actions have a fractional meaning such as
data lying in databases. Moreover, in order to deal with op-
erations that cannot be understood through a fractional view,
FRBAC allows to defuzzificate the access decision making it
binary. Hierarchical and constrained versions of FRBAC has
been also described in the paper. Although we present FRBAC
to deal with these scenarios, others scenarios could also be ac-
commodated due to the flexibility of the model.
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